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Article 5

BOOK REVIEWS
ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY, ANATOMY OF A POLICY FAILURE.

By

Dominick T Armentano. New York: Wiley, 1982. Pp. xi, 292.
Rev'ewed by Janet P. Ailstock.*
American antitrust laws have been under increasing attack
throughout the 1970's and the 1980's, an attack possibly spurred by
vigorous prosecution of the laws during the 1960's and the Warren
Court's pro-antitrust stance.' The prestigious "Chicago School" of
industrial organization economics has provided much of the intellec2
tual support for this "anti-antitrust" movement.
The foundation of the American antitrust system and, therefore,
the lightning rod for the "anti-antitrust" argument is the Sherman
Act of 1890.3 The Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade," 4- and forbids "monopoliz[ation], or attempt[s] to monopolize." 5 Congress enacted these sections for both political and economic reasons. Politically, public distrust of increasingly
concentrated economic power was spreading rapidly during the
1870's and 1880's.6 Economically, thae social benefit of competition,
whether described as the desirable effect of competitive conduct or
the optimal condition of a competitive market structure, has long
7
been clear to economists.
Court interpretation of the Sherman Act has reflected this dual
*

Economic Analyst, Antitrust Section, State of Florida. B.A., University of Florida,

1974.
The assistance of Roger D. Blair, Professor of Economics at the University of Florida and
Michael I. Spiegel, Deputy Attorney General, Antitrust Division, State of California, in review and commentary was helpful in preparing this review.
I Remarks by W. Mueller, The Anti-Antitrust Movement, Address for Conference on
Industrial Organization and Public Policy, Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont
(April 16, 1981)(available in Notre Dame Law Review office).
2 The "Chicago School" is so known because of the prominence of University of Chicago economists in its ranks. Two of the.better known authors in the Chicago School are
Robert H. Bork and John S. McGee.
3 Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
4 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
5 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
6 See Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitnris Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 221

(1956).
7 See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTIrRUST POLICY 11-20 (1959).
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purpose. Court decisions have held purely anticompetitive conduct,
such as price-fixing, illegal under the Sherman Act 8 as well as conduct which tends to lessen competition or tends to sustain a firm's
intent to monopolize a market. 9 Predatory pricing, price discrimination and horizontal mergers also may, under varying circumstances,
lessen competition in the free market and thereby violate the Sherman Act.' 0
In contradistinction to this classical view, many Chicago School
economists contend that mergers, joint ventures, vertical distribution
schemes and price discrimination have more competitive than anticompetitive effects. Therefore, they argue, diversion of conduct
away from these now-illegal practices produces inefficiencies to producers and higher costs to the public. Thus, they disagree with contemporary application of antitrust policy, not its stated goal of
maintaining a competitive market. They accept the basic premise
that price fixing and market division, with the resultant output restrictions, are undesirable due to the tendency to cause higher prices,
inefficient cost structures anfd misallocation of society's resources
(commonly referred to as a "welfare loss"). They contend, however,
that the competitive market, over time, will mitigate the harmful effects of such conspiracies."I
Although it is not without its critics,' 2 this school of thought has
been gaining support during the past decade due to its careful use of
microeconomic theory. Not surprisingly, financial support for the
"anti-antitrust" movement has been provided by the business community. Foundations, such as the American Enterprise Institute, the
Hoover Institution, the Heritage Foundation and the Law and Economics Center at Emory University, have become established centers
for conservative economic thought primarily financed by the business
commmunity. 13 The Law and Economics Center, for example, invites law professors and members of the judiciary to attend an expense-paid two week seminar that exposes them to scholars who
lecture on conservative economic principles and the dangers of gov8 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 219-24 (1940).
9 See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 1773 (1975).
10 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
11 R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 7-8 (1978)[hereinafter cited as BORK].
12 See Adams, Antitrust and a Free Economy, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE
MARKET SYSTEM 33-44 (1979) (short review of the need for a vigorous antitrust enforcement
policy).
13 Mueller, supra note 1, at 10-11.
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ernmental interference in the affairs of business.' 4 Their position is
spread in the numerous books and articles published under their auspices. For example, the Law and Economics Center recently published The Attack on CorporateAmerica, containing a series of essays on
the antitrust laws. 15 These essays could potentially serve as position
papers for business executives, the type of tear-sheet speeches suitable
for a local businessman's lunch club monthly meeting. In that fashion, they may be used to promote the philosophy that since the market will take care of anticompetitive practices, enforcement of the
antitrust laws is inefficient.
The popularity of the "anti-antitrust" movement can be seen in
many of the -policies of the Reagan administration. Attorney General William F. Smith has said, "In the past, under the guise of promoting competition, other administrations have pursued a number of
misguided and mistaken concepts that have generated anticompetitive results in the name of antitrust enforcement. . . .[S]ome argue
that competition is synonymous with a large number of competitors.
Economic reality, however, is more complex." 1 6 The Department of
Justice has recently revised its merger guidelines to allow greater
merger activity. 17 David Stockman, Director of the OMB, has said,
18
"I disagree with the whole antitrust tradition."
The "movement" has successfully promulgated its views to those
in positions of power, if not to the general public. Professor Armentano's book properly can be evaluated only against this political
backdrop.
Professor Armentano's book provides an interesting review of
the basic economic theories underlying competition law and the major cases which have shaped it. However, although he agrees with
the Chicago School's criticisms of the antitrust laws, he goes far beyond them. He believes, as the Chicago School adherents do, that
the implementation of the Sherman Act has been misguided due to
the lack of understanding of competitive, efficient business behavior.
He also asserts, however, that the neoclassical model, which is the
basis for defining the optimal allocation of society's resources and
upon which American antitrust law is predicated, is flawed. He be14

Washington Post, Jan. 20, 1980, at Al, col. 3.

15

THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA 173-302 (M.B. Johnson ed. 1978).

16 Attomiy General William French Smith s Remarks to District of Colunbia Bar, [July-Dec.]
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1021, at H-2 (July 2, 1981).
17 Justice Department Merger Guidelines, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 1069, at S-3 (June 17, 1982).
18 Mueller, supra note 1, at 12.
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lieves that the real obstructions to productivity in a free market are
not cartels or monopolists, which the model describes as non-optimal,
but the government and its regulations which impose restraints on
business through its protectionist policies such as import tariffs, regulatory schemes, quotas and licensing (p. 272).
His persistent charge against the government as a participant or
co-conspirator in the perpetuation of monopoly power is an argument with which few industrial economists would disagree. But
while he deplores governmentally sanctioned monopoly power on the
one hand, he neglects to discuss the frequent genesis of such monopoly power. Thus, he ignores the traditional teaching that concentration of wealth and the tendency for large corporate wealth to wield
its power over the government often results in the enactment of anticompetitive statutes and regulations for their respective industries.
The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 because of public distrust
of such aggregation of wealth and its attendant concentration of economic power; thus, the Act traces its origins to both political and
economic foundations.1 9 Therefore, even though the economic effects of the Act are certainly relevant to antitrust policy, it is myopic
to discuss the Act and its consequences exclusively from that perspective.20 Professor Armentano's analysis of the very real problem of
governmental monopoly fails to adequately consider the political
side of the competition problem. Evidently, he was caught on the
horns of a dilemma, for a discussion of the political aspects of concentration of wealth and the ability it generates to capture the government would have diffused his arguments favoring horizontal merger
activity and the resultant concentrated industries.
Armentano divides his analysis into two major sections. The
first two chapters contain a review of economic price theory and a
critique of the neoclassical economic model, an important component of price theory, which underlies competition policy. These
chapters are the most important in the book. He believes that the
model fails to support the basic premises about the nature of competitive behavior that have evolved over the past century (pp. 22-25).
Thus, if competitive behavior has been misunderstood, the cases distinguishing competitive behavior are inherently wrong (p. 6). The

theoretical arguments developed in these two chapters provide the
bases on which Armentano critiques the adjudication of specific ille19
20

See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
Blake & Jones, In Defense ofAnitust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1965).
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gal business conduct under the Sherman Act. The following seven
chapters discuss this conduct and the major determining cases.
Professor Armentano's questioning of the neoclassical model
stems from his historical explanation of market conditions in 18601890 and the impetug for the enactment of the Sherman Act. Citing
Joseph McGuire's book Business and Society,21 he notes the inconsistency of juxtaposing the increasing collusion by firms during the
post-Civil War period with remarkable increases in technology and
severe competition in the market (p. 14). To the practitioners of antitrust enforcement, however, these circumstances are not inconsistent but rather are entirely predictable. An empirical review of the
antitrust cases prosecuted by the Justice Department indicates that
collusive activities are more frequent in depressed markets. 2 2 In fact,
firms faced with depressed prices and spare capacity naturally seek to
maintain profits by cutting prices, making technological improvements to increase efficiency and cut costs, and, especially for the inefficient or unlucky (or incompetent) firms unsuccessful in so
improving their operations, fixing prices. Thus, economists would expect to find increasing collusive conduct during the post-Civil War
period, which spanned two major business recessions.
Thus, Armentano's intellectual basis for re-examiningthe neoclassical model is a tenuous one at best. I would suspect that the
current "anti-antitrust" movement played a greater role in his desire
to critique the model than any apparent historical inconsistency easily explained in the industrial organization literature. The first sentence of the Introduction, a quotation from Lester Thurow, further
corroborates these suspicions: "It is now admitted that contrary to
the conventional wisdom, the enforcement of the antitrust laws may
have made the economy less efficient, and may have been an important contributing factor to the steady decline of business productivity
in America" (p. 1). Professor Thurow, a well known M.I.T. economist, is one of the popularizers of the belief that the antitrust laws
have failed to keep our economy competitive. His criticisms of the
antitrust laws are often the subject of articles in newspapers and
magazines. 23 However, Professor Thurow is not an industrial organization economist by training, and his arguments in favor of concentration, product differentiation and various other anticompetitive
21
22
23

J. McGuIRE, BUSINESS

AND SOCIETY (1963).
Hay & Kelly, An EmpiricalSurv of 1Pice Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J. L. & EcON. 13 (1974).
N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, at 2F, col. 3;Abolish the Antitrust Laws, 117 DUN'S REv. 72

(February 1981)..
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practices 24 have come under severe criticism.2 5
Professor Armentano sees a basic flaw in the neoclassical model's
description of an individual firm's demand curve under conditions of
perfect competition. To understand Armentano's objection to the
model, a brief description of the model is necessary. The model provides the basis for defining the optimal allocation of society's resources and anchors present competition policy. It suggests that a
society's resources will be most efficiently employed and consumers
will be better off under conditions of perfect competition. Perfect
competition exists when there are many small sellers in the market.
Any one seller perceives that his output decisions will not affect the
market price that consumers pay for the produced goods. In other
words, each firm believes that prices are determined by market supply and demand rather than by any one firm's output decision. Consequently, an individual firm has no economic incentive to reduce
production in order to achieve a higher price for its goods. Firms
reduce their production when the cost to produce an additional unit
(the marginal cost of production) exceeds the price received for that
unit. Thus, an individual firm's demand curve is said to be horizontal or flat, because the price received for the output (the height of the
curve), remains constant regardless of the quantity produced (the distance from the vertical axis)*26
Economists, both critics and supporters of the antitrust laws,
generally accept that the model of pure competition may be "an extreme statement, since it may be that all sellers can affect market
price somewhat, but it is conventional to ignore very small effects
and to draw the individual firm's demand curve flat in fragmented
markets."

27

Professor Armentano rejects this conventional approach because
he rejects the possibility that any firm can have a horizontal demand
curve. This rejection is founded on the existence of a model that
predicts how a firm will act under conditions of imperfect competition. This model predicts that when a market is highly concentrated
or when firms are colluding a dominant firm or a group of colluding
firms can increase the market price through their output decisions.
Thus, one firm would have the incentive to reduce its output to an
optimal quantity, which would maintain a higher market price for
24

L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 145-50 (1980).

25
26

See Mueller, supra note 1, at 13-26.
F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 12-

14 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Scherer].
27 BORK, supra note 11, at 92-93.
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less output and result in higher overall profits. When this situation of
imperfect competition exists, a firm is said to have a negative sloping
demand curve, because the more it produces, the less it receives per
unit of production. Consequently, the firm can restrict its output
28
and receive a higher price per unit.
Professor Armentano asserts that because a seller's output decision might have an effect on market price, all sellers have a negative
sloping demand curve. Thus, to him, all sellers have an incentive to
restrict their output to a point where marginal cost is just equal to
marginal revenue, which is less than the market price. This results in
a higher market price and a lower quantity produced. He says that it
becomes "obvious then that such behavior can no longer be uniquely
associated with market power, but is, instead, the natural conduct
and performance of all business organizations" (p. 24).
Professor Armentano is correct that the "natural conduct" for a
firm is to attempt to achieve a higher price for its product, thereby
maximizing its profits. In fact, recognition of man's tendency towards achieving a higher price was expressed long ago by Adam
Smith: "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy
against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices."' 29 However, competition policy does not strive to prohibit the "natural conduct" of a firm's desire to achieve a higher price for its goods.
Unfortunately, Professor Armentano's discussion of "natural
conduct" emanating from the imperfect competition model ignores
the effects of the countervailing tensions of competition in the market
place working against a firm's objective of profit maximization.
Price theory predicts that competition will only allow a firm to receive the market price for its product, because "any manufacturer
who quoted a price above the prevailing market price would make
zero sales, since every purchaser would turn to another supplier." 30
Thus, it is not obvious why a firm operating in a competitive market,
and acting unilaterally, would "naturally" act like a monopoly, restricting its output to a level of production above the competitive
market price, thereby losing all of its sales. Professor Armentano's
failure to consider the impact of competition, which would reverse
any "natural conduct" of the tendency to restrict output in order to
achieve a higher price, is entirely inconsistent with the views ex28

R. BLAIR, MICROECONOMICS FOR MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 330-33 (1982).

29 A. SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk. I, ch. X (1776).
30 BORK, sufra note 11, at 92-93.
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pressed in Chapter Five. There he states that the competitive market
is vigorous enough to ameliorate the harmful effects of the most egregious price-fixing agreements (p. 137). Thus, he believes that competition is a pervasive, vigorous force in the market place. However, his
"natural conduct" argument chooses to incorporate these effects only
selectively.
Professor Armentano further objects to the model because it is
static rather than dynamic. This static nature is generally accepted
by economists, but they still find the model useful because it "represents the ultimate situation toward which economic forces tend to
31
drive the firm."
Professor Armentano, having rejected the competitive model,
suggests an alternative approach to achieve the desired goal of maximizing society's welfare. In this discussion he assumes that "individual human action is purposeful and aims at accomplishing selected
ends by adopting patterns of resource use (plans) consistent with
those ends. If the means employed in the pursuit of selected ends are
consistent with those ends, thus the means or plans are said to be
efficiently employed" (p. 29). Having adopted that assumption, he

believes that any business conduct, such as price fixing, market division or production restrictions can be efficient. One must have a
Rousseauan faith about man's business conduct to accept Armentano's assumption without empirical or theoretical proof. The
remainder of the book does not offer such proof.
The second section of the book reviews the major cases in antitrust law in light of the theoretical discussion in the first part. Chap32
ter Three (pp. 49-84) contains a review of Standard Oil of ewjersq,
a classic antitrust case. A study of the structure of the petroleum
industry in this country from 1846 to the present provides the facts
on which Armentano bases his hypothesis that monopoly is the result
of government intervention rather than the free market (p. 55). He is

convincing in his argument that the government has helped the petroleum industry achieve monopoly profits since 1911 through state
pro-rationing schemes designed to balance crude oil supply and demand, import tariffs designed to keep inexpensive Middle Eastern
crude oil out of U.S. markets during the 1960's, the favorable taxation schemes on oil provided through the depletion allowance and
foreign tax credit provisions during the 1960's and the price regulations and allocation controls in the 1970's (in which the U.S. Depart31
32

Id. at 95.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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ment of Energy performed the difficult and costly function of an
administrator of customer allocation schemes, initially drafted by the
industry and later adopted by the federal government). Implicit in a
customer allocation agreement is the objective that suppliers will not
compete for existing customers. Obviously, the absence of competition to supply customers results in a higher price structure than if
competition for supplies were present.
Professor Armentano's belief that because competition was rampant in the oil industry prior to World War I, there was no need to
divest the Standard Oil Trust of its monopoly power is more controversial. Even though the Standard Oil Trust controlled 90% of the
rapidly growing petroleum industry in 1890, 33 Armentano attributes

Standard Oil's market power to its intense competitive nature and its
competitive conduct. Indices of competitive behavior in the petroleum industry were secret rebates to railroads, predatory pricing
practices (the objective of which was to drive competitors out of the
market) and the buying up of competitors in order to achieve greater
market power (pp. 60-63). According to Armentano, "there was no
restriction of supply and monopoly prices were never realized, even
during periods of relatively high market share" (p. 66). Unfortunately, on reading this example of supposedly misdirected antitrust
enforcement, one is not convinced that the Standard companies were
not engaging in conduct that contributed to a lessening of competition. Predatory pricing may be competitive in nature, but when employed by a firm with 90% market power its effect could be less than
socially optimal if it prohibited the entry of new, efficient competitors. Such conduct on the part of a monopolist would tend to artificially stimulate demand while the prices were below cost, generating
hidden social costs, and then extract monopoly profits after the competitors were forced out of the market.
Chapter Five contains a review of price-fixing theory and several
cases (pp. 133-166). Although Armentano is not convinced that successful price-fixing conspiracies necessarily work against the public
interest, due to the socially beneficial results from "natural conduct"
(p. 133), he doubts that conditions would ever permit the success of

such a price-fixing agreement. Armentano thus follows the belief of
his "Chicago School" colleagues that cartel prices lead to excess profits which attract entry of new firms. If this entry process is instantaneous the price-fixing ring would be unsuccessful because greater
33

B.

BRINGHURST, ANTITRUST AND THE OIL MONOPOLY

1 (1979).
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supply generated by these new firms would drive prices down. 34
However, even Bork recognizes that "[a]ntitrust is valuable because
in some cases we need not suffer losses while waiting for the market to
erode cartels and monopolistic mergers.)

35

In the real world, markets do exist which, over a substantial period of time, meet the following conditions: inelasticity of demand,
concentrated industry, and barriers to entry while demand is increasing. In these difficult-to-enter industries, the social costs of allowing
cartels or concentration is great. Classic examples, omitted by Professor Armentano but presently on the minds of the American public
are the American steel and auto industries and their failure to compete on a price basis with foreign competition during the 1970's. Entry barriers such as economies of scale, product differentiation and
import tariffs insulated them from the effects of domestic and foreign
competition for years, and now they find themselves non-competitive
compared to their more efficient foreign rivals. We are presently experiencing the pernicious effects in unemployment and higher prices
from a lack of maintaining domestic competition within these two
very important industries. Although there may be few concentrated
markets where entry barriers are high, the need for a vigorous antitrust policy to ensure competition in these markets through market
structure guidelines or through acceptable conduct rules is a point
Armentano neglects to underscore.
Instead, ignoring the misallocation of resources problem, he reverts back to his earlier premise that all agreements are the result of
"natural conduct" and "are explicit evidence of an attempt to increase efficiency and ought to be allowed" (p. 137). He believes the
loss to society is not subject to rigorous measurement, and so these
losses are subjective in nature (p. 138). Because he believes the benefits of price fixing could outweigh the costs of prohibiting price fixing,
he recommends abolishing even this prohibition in the antitrust laws.
The most serious danger to him in prohibiting price fixing is the
possible misinterpretation that "tacit agreement" or interdependence
among oligopolists may be misperceived as collusion by the authorities (p. 138). There is much debate concerning theories of tacit collusion in oligopoly, 36 and this important legal question remains

unanswered by antitrust scholars and practitioners. Bork believes
that "[o]ligopoly theory is really a first cousin of the theory of overt
34
35
36

See BORK, supra note 11, at 311.
Id.
See SCHERER, supra note 26, at 149-182.
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collusion. '37 However, since the penalty for price fixing is a felony
conviction, price fixing is a clandestine act. Consequently, it is very
difficult for prosecutors to obtain evidence of an agreement and the
empirical evidence for establishing the existence of agreement is difficult to discover. Armentano's treatment of the oligopoly problem is
a superficial one at best.
Armentano reviews three price-fixing cases in which he concludes that the conspiracies were ineffectual in sustaining high prices
(pp. 138-163). The Department of Justice brought these cases, so it is
not surprising that empirical evidence concerning the amount of the
overcharge attributable to the conspiracy did not exist. The Department of Justice prosecutes for relief, not proprietary injury.
Overcharges to the consumers, which are only one measure of damages to society, would be more accurately measured by reviewing private antitrust cases.
In summary, Armentano's acceptance of the conclusions that
the competitive model is inaccurate, that a firm's "natural conduct"
is output-restricting behavior, and that any business behavior is efficient and thus socially optimal, are the bases for his proposal to abolish the antitrust laws. According to Armentano, concentrated
industries or monopolies are socially optimal due to the arbitrariness
of the model (p. 39); price fixing is efficient because business behavior
is always efficient; price discrimination is competitive behavior because his perceived flaw in the model prevents reaching the goal of
perfect competition (p. 168); and tying agreements should be allowed
because one has difficulty measuring their costs or benefits (p. 225).
That his analysis requires three hundred pages is not evidence of rigorous proof of these theories, but rather his proselytizing approach to
the subject.

37

See BORK, supra note 11, at 185.

